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A survey of property theory and tenure 
types
Bruce Rigsby
[I]f kinship be regarded as the social instrument that struc-
turalizes the fundamental roles which individuals play to-
ward each other as persons, property as a social institution is 
the instrument that structuralizes the roles which individu-
als play in the complex system of human relations that pre-
vail in regard to the ownership of valuable objects, whether 
material or not (Hallowell 1955[1943]:246).
[P]roperty is always a contested concept ... [and it] changes 
over time (Radin 1993:119).
In the evolutionary anthropology of the past century and its successors 
up into the 1950s, property was a notable concept, but with the rise 
of new interests in and concerns with ecology and evolution, property 
and tenure (or ownership) were by and large replaced by terms such 
as territoriality, range and use1 in anthropological studies of people/
1  Barnard and Spencer (1996:625) wrote:
territoriality A slightly ambiguous term which may refer either to cul-
tural mechanisms to define or defend territory or to observed behaviour 
indicating a preference for remaining within a given teritory. The term 
is is common use in archaeology and social anthropology (especially in 
reference to hunter-gatherers), but often has ethological connotations 
(emphasis in original). Some early notable references to works that 
exemplify the shift to cological and evolutionary approaches are Damas 
(1969a, 1969b) and Lee and De Vore (1968). Amongst Australianists, 
Peterson (1975, 1976, 1986 plus other items) and Hunn and Williams 
(1982) are significant. Williams (1997) includes a section on ‘Territory/
Territoriality’ that surveys the broader literature, including contributions 
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land relations. In our country, following the 1992 Mabo No. 2 deci-
sion and the federal Native Title Act 1993, Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people’s rights and interests in land under their traditional law 
and custom are recognisable by the common law where they have not 
been extinguished by acts of the Crown or other adverse acts. This sea 
change in the law respecting indigenous land rights has implications for 
anthropological work in native title and other land-related actions. We 
need to refamiliarise ourselves with the theory and concepts of property 
and ownership, but at the same time, we should continue to study terri-
toriality, range and use.
Keesing (1981:67–75, 212, 213) distinguished cultural structure 
from social structure in the same way that Goodenough (1969:329–330) 
earlier differentiated cultural anthropology from social anthropology. 
The first is a system of organised knowledge and rules or principles 
held by social actors which we infer from our observations of their 
behaviour (including their speech and discourse), while the second is 
a system of patterned regularities we can infer from the same kinds of 
observations. In other words, we observe what people do and say, and 
we can model this either as a cultural system of organised knowledge 
and rules for action or behaviour or as a social system of patterned reg-
ularities of action or behaviour. Both perspectives are important for us 
as we seek to analyse and describe how people own and use land. If we 
take seriously the requirements that Mabo No. 2 and the Native Title Act 
1993 established, then we anthropologists and our clients must present 
to native title tribunals and federal courts evidence of fact and expert 
opinion that there is an ongoing system of traditional laws and customs 
by anthropologists. We suggest that it would be useful to explore the rela-
tionships amongst terms arranged by proportional analogy such that:
property : estate : possession : occupancy etc.
territoriality : range : defence : use etc.
One might speculate that the linkage of the institution of property with 
bourgeois liberal economic and political theory was also related to anthro-
pologists’ shift to evolutionary and ecological approaches.
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that connects people to their land and waters. This includes a system of 
tenure, as well as a system of use. Customary marine tenure2 adds to the 
challenge that the study of property and the traditional Aboriginal own-
ership of land pose for us. Cordell (1993:163) observed that ‘land and 
marine tenure may be divisible for the sake of analysis, but from indig-
enous coastal peoples’ perspectives[,] they are indivisible’. The point is 
important not only as a representation of indigenous beliefs and values, 
but also as a statement that terrestrial and marine tenure should be ana-
lysed and described in a single account, using the same kinds of terms 
and relations amongst them.
Tenure, property rights and objects of property
There is a wider body of theory that we can draw upon to better under-
stand Aboriginal tenure systems.3 The concepts of tenure (or ownership) 
2  Any serious consideration of customary marine tenure in Australia 
must refer to the work of John Cordell. It was Cordell’s (1989) excellent 
collection of papers on sea tenure that helped to frame a general field for 
study, and it is his (Cordell 1992, 1993) less inclusive term ‘customary 
marine tenure’ that has captured a wider audience. Hviding (1996:388–
389) noted that he introduced the term ‘customary marine tenure’ in 1987, 
published as Hviding (1989), and he provided a brief discussion of his 
choice of wording. Hviding (1996) is a superlative monograph, compre-
hensive in its coverage and elegantly written. We sometimes abbreviate 
customary marine tenure to CMT here. 
3  There is an extensive literature on property which includes earlier 
writers such as Locke, Hume, Proudhon and Bentham and extends to 
the present day (e.g. Munzer 1990; Radin 1993; Rose 1994). In another 
context, I (Rigsby 1997:31–34) sought to gain a perspective on the 
anthropological literature that American anthropologists might have 
drawn on to analyse and describe Indian systems of land tenure during 
the period the Indian Claims Commission operated, and this led me to 
read more widely in the property literature. Up until about 1955, anthro-
pology texts often included chapters or sections on property (e.g. Boas 
1938; Herskovits 1948, 1952[1940]; Lowie 1920, 1940, 1948) and the 
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and property are at its centre. Tenure and property always involve three 
terms; in symbolic logic, we say that the predicate ‘own’ takes three argu-
ments. We can formalise them in the proposition ‘A owns B as against 
C’, as did Brewer and Staves (1995:3); Hallowell (1955[1943]:239) 
and Paul (1987:193). This contrasts with the simpler ‘A owns B’, as in 
popular discourse and in Snare (1972:200), who spoke of ‘the special 
relationship which may hold between a person and a physical object 
called “owning”’.4
Tenure or ownership is the relationship of A to B as against C, while 
property, strictly speaking, is the rights that A has in B, the thing that 
A owns as against C. Hallowell (1955[1943]:239) noted that the term 
‘property’ has two common senses: it signifies both the object that is 
owned, as well the rights that are exercised over it.5 He argued, citing 
economists and lawyers, that the term should be restricted to the first 
sense. We accept his view and will use ‘object of property’ for the second 
sense (see also Rose 1994:253, 263; Waldron 1988:30). It also bears 
noting that B need not in fact be a physical object, but can be incorpo-
real knowledge, for example, see Lowie (1929).
wider social science literature included contributions from anthropol-
ogists (e.g. Lowie 1933). By and large, these anthropological writings 
were more descriptive, historical and encyclopaedic than analytical, but 
Radcliffe-Brown (1952[1935]) and Hallowell (1955[1943]) are exceptions. 
Anthropologists have been conspicuously absent from the more recent 
literature, and economists, historians, lawyers, philosophers and political 
scientists have been prominent contributors. In all its years, the Annual 
Review of Anthropology has not run a general overview article on land 
tenure, although Shipton (1994) surveyed the literature on African land 
tenure.
4  However, all Snare’s rules make reference to persons (C) other than A.
 Hann (1996:454) observed that ‘most anthropologists would now agree 
that rights over things are better understood as rights between people’. 
Munzer (1994:15ff) contrasts the ‘sophisticated’ relational view of prop-
erty with the ‘popular’ view of property as things.
5  See also the discussion in Williams (1986:202), which cites Hohfeld 
(1964), but does not privilege one sense over the other. 
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The inclusion of two personal (or group) arguments (namely, A and 
C) makes the owning relationship a social one. There is no property in 
nature apart from humans. As Demsetz (1967:346) expressed it:
In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no 
role. Property rights are an instrument of society and derive 
their significance from the fact that they help a man form 
those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his deal-
ings with others. These expectations find expression in the 
laws, customs, and mores of a society. An owner of property 
rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him to 
act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to 
prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided 
that these actions are not prohibited in the specification of 
his rights.
The property relationship is also a cultural phenomenon, i.e. it is based 
on symbolism, the arbitrary assignment of meaning. Marshall Sahlins 
(1996:1) recently reminded us that Leslie White used to say that an ape 
could not recognise the difference between holy water and distilled 
water for there is no chemical difference, only a symbolic one. Snare 
(1972:200) speculated that a Martian would understand little of our 
daily social life if he did not comprehend that much action makes sense 
only in the context of the property institution:
For example, he would completely miss what we are doing 
when we sell an automobile or give a gift or steal an apple. 
After all, a stolen apple doesn’t look any different from any 
other apple.
The triadic formulation of tenure and property relationships also 
recognises the insight encapsulated in the conventional definition 
of rights in rem as rights which A holds in B ‘as against the world’ 
(Radcliffe-Brown 1952[1935]:33; Munzer 1990:31; Rose 1994:271). 
The phrase ‘as against the world’ not only quantifies the C argument, 
but in so doing, it introduces the condition that ownership implies the 
right to exclude others from possession, occupation and use and enjoy-
ment of the object of property, for example, land (see Munzer 1990:89). 
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Common law courts and tribunals in land rights cases here and overseas 
have generally insisted on evidence that a claimant group has exercised 
its right to exclude others from its land, i.e. the right of exclusion is a 
sine qua non of ownership. In its absence, there is no ownership—there 
is no property.6
However, the triadic formulation of tenure and property relation-
ships remains incomplete as formulated because it fails to note that 
they exist only in the context of wider cultural and social systems which 
have internal and external dominion7 dimensions. It fails to note that 
the A and C parties constitute a polity, that is, a rule or norm-gener-
ating and—maintaining community, and it fails to note that the set of 
parties in C can generally be partitioned into those who are members of 
the polity and those who are not, for example citizens and residents vs 
foreigners, kin vs strangers, us vs them, etc. The quantification of C as 
‘as against the world’ has the same defect.
In the first respect, property relationships exist as a subset of the 
social relationships in a polity, and its members customarily and con-
ventionally acknowledge and observe one another’s property rights. 
Phrased another way, members of a polity hold beneficial or proxi-
mate titles (Sutton 1996a) in land and other objects of property. The 
polity itself, however, exercises dominion internally, that is, it sets the 
parameters of tenure and title.8 For example, in state-based polities, the 
6  Several writers (Williams 1982; McCay 1987) have commented on the 
difficulty of getting evidence for one indigenous group excluding others 
because public ideology stresses sharing and generosity. See below for 
further discussion of the right to exclude. 
7  Dominion is the aspect of sovereignty that polities exercise with 
respect to the ownership of land and waters in their territories. In earlier 
discourse, dominion was contrasted with sovereignty. The two terms 
respectively translate the Latin dominium and imperium, from Roman law 
and jurisprudence. Contemporary political thought sees dominion related 
to sovereignty as part to whole, not as a coordinate function of a polity. 
8  Walker (1980:1221) defined ‘title’ as ‘[t]he legal connection between 
a person and a right constituted by some act or event having legal sig-
nificance. Every right which a person has attaches to him by virtue of 
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state typically exercises rights of escheat, eminent domain, taxation and 
regulation. The latter may include zoning, building restrictions and 
requirements, etc. All these relate to its holding of the radical or under-
lying title to its territory. In classical and contemporary Aboriginal 
Australia, a non-state-organised polity, the leading men and elders of a 
region exercise the underlying title by mutually confirming one anoth-
er’s group proximate titles and by dealing with problematic cases, for 
example where a group dies out and/or where succession, boundaries, 
divided rights and the like are contested and disputed (Sutton 1996a).
In the second respect, polities have external relations with other 
polities, for example, state-based polities regulate whether and how 
non-citizens may hold property rights in their territories. In the 
common law countries, the courts have consistently held over the past 
few centuries that only the state (e.g. the Crown in Commonwealth 
countries) can acquire rights in land recognisable by its law in other 
territories. Only a state can acquire radical title to the territory (or a part 
of it) of another polity. Private individuals cannot do so. But to return to 
the triadic formulation of tenure and property relationships, the point is 
that the members of a polity cannot expect to have their property rights 
automatically recognised and respected by members of another. Tenure 
systems, i.e. systems of property rights, always exist in an ‘international’ 
inter-polity context. During the colonisation of the New World and our 
own country, it was often the case that the members of the indigenous 
some title, and rights of the same character, e.g. ownership of goods, 
may be vested in different persons by virtue of different kinds of titles, by 
making, by gifts, by purchase, by inheritance, and so on’. He also noted 
that ‘[i]n land law ‘titles’ or ‘title deeds’ denote those deeds which evi-
dence a person’s title to particular land, which require to be examined by 
a prospective buyer and which are transfered to him on completion of 
the purchase’. This definition seems incomplete for we generally speak of 
title with respect to some object of property to which rights and interests 
attach. Thus broadened, title as a legal connection can be used cross-cul-
turally, but in its sense as a sign of that connection, we note that in 
societies that lack writing, title deeds may be manifested in speech, song, 
dance, artistic designs, etc. 
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non-state-based polities did not have their property rights recognised 
by settler members of the colonising state-based polities, or even by the 
colonising polity itself. Such was the case with the property rights of 
Aboriginal people in land and waters under their own traditional law 
and custom until the Mabo No. 2 decision in June, 1992.
The origins and functions of property
Property is universal, an institution found in all human societies 
(Smith 1985:404, 407–408), and property in land similarly is univer-
sal—see Hallowell (1955[1943]:242–244), who noted that the denial 
that hunter-gatherers and pastoralists own land was ‘linked with the 
pseudo-history of the social evolutionary theories of the nineteeenth 
century’ and referred readers to Herskovits (1940) for evidence they 
own land. Hallowell (1955[1943]:249) concluded that one of the ‘pri-
mary contributions [of the institution of property] ... to a human social 
order and the security of the individual’ is that ‘individuals are secured 
against the necessity of being constantly on the alert to defend [valuable] 
objects [of property] from others by physical force alone’ (see also Rose 
1994:296). This is because in human societies, we internalise norms and 
values with respect to property. Over and above the anticipation and 
fear that other owners will exercise force and commit violence against 
us, we are motivated not to trespass by the wider ‘moral, religious, or 
legal penalties’ that may operate if we do not do our duty. The institution 
of property probably has an evolutionary history like those of kinship9 
9 See the opening quotation above from Hallowell (1955[1943]:246). 
He credited Bunzel (1938:340) for the insight of their parallelism. Smith 
(1985:404–406) argued that in the Old World, humans shifted from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture as climatic change, ‘overkill’ or what-
ever resulted in the ‘loss of the favoured easy prey [which] substantially 
increased the opportunity cost of hunting and gathering compared with 
agriculture’. He also suggested (p. 406) that ‘[a] good working hypothesis 
is that property rights and exchange predate the Agricultural Revolution’ 
and he argued this on the basis of the ethnographic evidence got from 
A survey of property theory and tenure types
45
and language that takes them back at least to the emergence of Homo 
sapiens sapiens. Phrased another way, we have always been territorial, 
like other contemporary hominoids, but when we became landowners, 
acquired kinfolk and began to speak modern-type language, we also 
became human.10
But if property is very old in our species, its specific objects none-
theless have shallower histories. It is a truism of our discipline that not 
all the plant and animal species and natural phenomena found in the 
environment of a particular society are recognised as resources and 
assigned value in its culture. No doubt many Aboriginal groups knew 
of the presence of gold in their countries before non-Aboriginal pros-
pectors and miners invaded their lands, but there is no reason to believe 
that gold was the object of specific property rights and interests in the 
indigenous tenure systems as it later became. Similarly, Aboriginal 
people have probably owned and used the beach and littoral areas of 
their estates for millenia, but whether they owned and used the off-
shore areas (especially the reefs and seagrass beds) where most dugongs 
and sea turtles are found in another question. This leads us to the ques-
tion of what are the conditions under which particular things become 
objects of property.
In the history of thought on the origins of property (see Umbeck 
1981:50–64), several kinds of theories were proposed. Much early 
Western thought (from the Greeks onward) regarded property as origi-
nating from God, so that property rights were considered to be ‘natural’ 
and people were obliged to respect them. The philosopher Locke argued 
in the 18th century that land and things became property only when 
humans invested their labour in their production, but a century earlier, 
Hobbes developed a social contract theory which survives in current 
theories. Hobbes’ Leviathan (1951 [1651]) situated the original contract 
hunter-gatherers studied during the past hundred years. 
10 Smith (1985:404) proposed that to be human means to use language, 
tools, organization, property rights and exchange, but that only exchange 
is unique to humans. We disagree and restrict language and property 
rights similarly. 
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squarely in human society and the acquisitive, maximising propensities 
of people. For Hobbes, the right each individual had to the use of his 
own physical power or labour was the only natural right. In the absence 
of any agreements, people must live in a continual state of ‘warre’ with 
their neighbors. ‘It is consequent also to the same condition, that there 
be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that 
to be every man’s that he can get: and for so long as he can keep it’ 
(Hobbes 1951[1651]:83–84, cited by Umbeck 1981:1, 51).
In The Social Contract, Rousseau (1938[1762]) took issue with 
Hobbes’ view that ‘Might makes right’, but he contributed to help-
ing to understand the costs associated with the original contract. He 
concluded that where resources have little or no economic value, a 
contract regulating their use would probably not be made. Rousseau 
(1938[1762]68–69, cited by Umbeck 1981:53) wrote:
Unfriendly and barren lands, where the product does not 
repay the labour, should remain desert and uncultivated, or 
peopled only by savages; lands where men’s labour brings in 
no more than the exact minimum to subsistance should be 
inhabited by barbarous peoples: in all such places all polity 
is impossible.
Umbeck (1981:53) thought it possible to assemble ‘a fairly full theory 
of the creation of private property rights from the work of Hobbes and 
Rousseau’. Where there are no agreements, rights are determined by 
personal violence and force. In such situations, much potential income 
is lost that could be got by contracting with others to grant and recog-
nise exclusive rights to property. However, the contract will be costly to 
form and enforce. Given the costs, the gains from contracting increase 
with the value of the resources to be made private property.
Umbeck (1981:53) also noted that the social contract theory fell 
into disfavour after Rousseau and for nearly two centuries the relation-
ship among property rights, contract and the state was forgotten or 
ignored. He said that it was reintroduced into modern price theory by 
way of the literature on ‘externalities’. Umbeck (1981:53–64) reviews the 
development of the externality concept from Pigou (1938) and Knight 
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(1924) through Coase (1960), Gordon (1954) and Cheung (1970, 1974) 
to Demsetz (1967).11
Demsetz (1967:350) proposed that property rights emerge, i.e. they 
are assigned, ‘with the emergence of new or different beneficial and 
harmful effects’. Communities assign property rights ‘when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization’. By ‘inter-
nalization’, Demsetz means that the beneficial and harmful effects of 
actions, such as hunting, fishing, mining, cutting timber, etc. then are 
brought squarely to bear on owners as they so act and exercise their 
property rights.12
The primary empirical case that Demsetz examined in support 
of his theory was that of the development of private property rights 
in land amongst Northeastern Algonkian peoples.13 Originally, men 
11  Common (1988:79) wrote: ‘An external effect, or externality, exists 
when the activity of a firm or a household gives rise to consequences for 
other firms or households, which consequences are not intentional and do 
not figure in the costs or benefits associated with the activity as perceived 
by the originating firm or household. A good example of an externality is 
the release by a firm of polluting waste products in some environmental 
media.’ See also Neher (1990:225) and Tisdell (1993:4–5). 
12  See also Neher (1990:159) and Tisdell (1991:55). Anderson and Hill 
(1975) is in the same vein as Demsetz (1967). 
13  See Leacock (1954) and Hickerson (1967), who argued that precontact 
Northeast Algonkians owned land communally and that the ownership 
of hunting territories by famiies and individuals developed as a result of 
their involvement in the fur trade. Rose (1994:26, 200, 287), Schmidtz 
(1994:51–52) and Waldron (1988:7–9) recapitulated Demsetz’ account. 
Gordon (1954:134–135) referred to Speck (1926) and Malinowski (1935) 
when he wrote that ‘stable primitive cultures appear to have discovered 
the dangers of common-property tenure and to have developed measures 
[i.e. private property in land] to protect their resources’. Speck was an early 
advocate of the view that Northeast Algonkian family hunting territo-
ries were precontact. Berkes’ (1989b) chapter, ‘Cooperation from the 
Perspective of Human Ecology’ in Berkes (1989a) surveyed and analysed 
new empirical material on James Bay Cree hunting territories and he cor-
rected and criticised Demsetz’ (1967) analysis thoroughly. 
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hunted game primarily for food and the furs they required for their 
own use. There was no need to assess the impact of one’s own actions 
on the stocks of game nor to assess the effects of others’ hunting the 
same game on one’s own chances. But with the advent of the fur trade, 
the exchange-value of furs increased greatly as also did the scale of 
hunting. It then became advantageous for hunters to husband and 
conserve fur-bearing animals by hunting over only a portion of their 
land each year in rotation and by excluding trespassers and punishing 
poachers. The assignment of property rights in specific territories was a 
response to the new conditions. They allowed a community to adjust to 
new cost-benefit possibilities where the costs of not assigning property 
rights had become greater than the costs of assigning them.14
Umbeck (1981) proposed a contractarian theory for the emergence 
and assignment of property rights in land. His primary empirical case 
was California for perhaps two decades from the discovery of gold in 
1848. The United States acquired California from the Mexican Republic 
by treaty the same year, and the new military governor abolished 
Mexican law, which had regulated mining previously. The 200,000 or 
so miners who rushed into the territory encountered a situation where 
they were technically trespassers and there was no American law reg-
ulating access to minerals on public lands. The new state government 
did not commence activities until 1850 and did not fund a law enforce-
ment operation for a few more years. But as Umbeck (1981:5) noted, 
‘[y]et by 1850..., miners had organized into groups and had agreed 
upon explicit contracts in which exclusive and transferrable rights to 
land were assigned to individuals within a given mining area or district. 
By 1866 over 500 separate and distinct districts were formed, each with 
their own system of property rights’. He also observed that while the 
contracts varied in some respects, each ‘explicitly enumerates the rights 
that each miner shall be allowed in choosing between alternative land 
uses and the amounts of land each miner can claim as his own property’.
Umbeck’s social contract theory is grounded in the human capac-
ity for violence and it attempts to identify situations where the cost 
14  Smith (1975) is in the same vein. 
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of violence leads people to forego it and to enter into property rights 
arrangements with one another. He (1981:28) wrote:
For property rights to exist, some individuals must be able to 
exclude others from using or deriving income from a good. 
Ultimately, this ability to exclude depends on violence. Any 
contract in which individuals explicitly agree to assign and 
maintain exclusive rights will succeed or fail depending on 
the group’s ability to use or threaten to use violence. The con-
tract, if it is formed, must assign to each individual the exclu-
sive rights to property equal in value to what the individual 
could get through personal violence. This distribution is pre-
dictable, given the relative abilities of individuals in violence 
and, [for example,] mining and the relative productivity of 
land. In order for the contract to be formed, ... [two] con-
ditions are necessary: there must be economies of scale in 
violence, and there must be some advantage to being ‘first.’ 
These two conditions are not sufficient. The third condition, 
which is necessary and sufficient, is that there are positive 
costs of contracting, these costs must be less than the gains 
[of violence and not contracting].
Umbeck (1981:60–64) criticised Demsetz’ account of the instituting of 
private property rights amongst Northeastern Algonkians in response 
to the fur trade, and he argued that his own contractarian theory was 
mutually exclusive with Demsetz’ externality-based theory. Umbeck 
(1981:64) contrasted the two theories, and he concluded:
property rights do not emerge from nowhere. They are sub-
ject to individual choice. Because individuals in the real 
world have chosen not to assign property rights to regulate 
all possible margins of resource use, the decisions about 
resource use are not necessarily made outside the market. 
Rather, it is an indication that the market for property rights 
is not without costs. It is more economical not to assign 
rights to some resources and, in so doing, allow them to be 
used in ways different from private property. To observe a 
resource, the rights to which have never been assigned, and 
to label its use externality, is to label our ignorance of the rel-
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evant constraints. To suggest ways to remedy this externality 
without studying the relevant constraints is to demonstrate 
our ignorance.
...Before any type of economic activity—Crusoe islands 
aside—can take place, there must be some type of contract 
specifying who has what rights to what resources. All indi-
vidual production decisions... are constrained at many mar-
gins by contracts... Every time a good is exchanged, some 
type of contract is implied. The contract is the basic building 
block of economic activity. Only by understanding the con-
tractual constraints under which each individual operates 
and the costs associated with new contractual arrangements 
will economics ever be able to explain the wide range of hu-
man behavior we observe every day.
No matter which of the theories—Demsetz’ or Umbeck’s—we opt for, 
both are relevant to customary marine tenure in Australia, for they 
lead us to believe that property rights in offshore sea country and its 
resources only developed when Aboriginal people got watercraft that 
made them accessible and when they acquired technology and tech-
niques that made the hunting of dugongs and sea turtles on reefs and 
seagrass beds possible.15 Similarly, property rights in bailershell, cone 
15  It is generally accepted that the first colonisers (in the biogeographical 
sense) must have had seaworthy watercraft (perhaps rafts) to make the 
journey to Greater Australia successfully, but it is not clear that that tradi-
tion of making and using such watercraft continued without interruption 
to the present. With respect to dugout canoes, which make offshore 
waters, islands, etc. accessible, it is generally accepted that the Macassans 
brought dugouts to the Top End several centuries ago, and that the 
single- and double-outrigger technology found in Torres Strait and along 
the northeastern coast of our continent at the time of European contact 
derives ultimately from Melanesian sources. Some scholars believe that 
simple dugout technology (without outriggers) on the east coast, whatever 
its ultimate origins, dates back several millenia, while others consider 
the dugout-cum-outrigger complex to have arrived from Melanesia only 
in the past few centuries. Dugout canoes not infrequently drift in to the 
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shell, giant clams, mother-of-pearl shell and other reef resources would 
have arisen with new demand and with new technology and techniques 
to harvest them. Groups assigned property rights in the new resources 
when it became too costly not to do so, whether by way of reduced pro-
duction or of increased intergroup violence.
The character of property rights
Property rights are a subset of the rights16 that members of a society (or 
polity or community) have and exercise, and one way to identify them 
is simply to list them. For example, A.M. Honore (1961; summarised by 
Becker 1977:18–19; see also Munzer (1990:22) and Waldron (1988:49)) 
proposed that the ‘full’ or ‘liberal’ concept of ownership included eleven 
kinds of rights, which are:
The right to possess—that is, to exclusive physical control of the thing 
owned. Where the thing cannot be possessed physically, due, for 
example, to its ‘non-corporeal’ naure, ‘possession’ may be under-
stood metaphorically or simply as the right to exclude others from 
the use and other benefits of the thing.
east coast of Cape York Peninsula. In November, 1975, Athol Chase and I 
saw a small (less than two metres) single-outrigger canoe that had drifted 
onto the beach near our camp on the mainland near Cape Sidmouth. It 
was seaworthy and the children played about with it. In May, 1997, we 
saw another small single-outrigger canoe beached not far north of Cape 
Sidmouth, but it was holed or split. Chase saw larger (six metres or more) 
double outrigger canoes washed onto Night Island and the beach near 
the Pascoe River in the 1970s. Aboriginal people say that such canoes 
come from the Solomon Islands. It is unclear whether their ancestors first 
acquired dugouts with outriggers by constructing them from such models 
or whether Torres Strait Islanders introduced the complex and instructed 
people in their construction. 
16  See Williams (1986:123–124, endnote 7.) for a good discussion of the 
notion of ‘right’.
Customary marine tenure in Australia
52
The right to use—that is, to personal enjoyment and use of the thing as 
distinct from 3 and 4 below.
The right to manage—that is, to decide how and by whom a thing shall 
be used.
The right to the income—that is, to the benefits derived from the fore-
going personal use of a thing and allowing others to use it.
The right to the capital—that is, the power to alienate the thing and to 
consume, waste, modify, or destroy it.
The right to security—that is, immunity from expropriation.
The power of transmissibility—that is, the power to devise or bequeath 
the thing.
The absence of term—that is, the indeterminate length of one’s owner-
ship rights.
The prohibition of harmful use—that is, one’s duty to forbear from 
using the thing in certain ways harmful to others.
Liability to execution—that is, liability to have the thing taken away for 
repayment of a debt.
Residuary character—that is, the existence of rules governing the rever-
sion of lapsed ownership rights.
Although Honore considered the total complement comprised full 
ownership in ‘mature legal systems’, he said that none was essential to 
ownership—even the right to possession could be restricted.
Scholars have generally considered that the right to exclude others 
from entry and use is criterial or diagnostic of property rights in land, 
but Hallowell (1955[1943]:239–240) observed some time ago that our 
Western view that exclusive possession and use are essential to the prop-
erty relationship is ‘only one specific constellation of property rights, 
a limiting case, as it were’, and that absolute property rights are not 
found in any society. Sutton (1996a:9–14) recently examined the right 
of exclusion in indigenous Australian systems of land tenure. He noted 
(1996a:11) that acts of physical exclusion are rare, and he considered 
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that the right of exclusion has been overemphasised. He concluded (p. 
14):
That such a right is in many cases qualified.
That such a right is only one aspect of the relevant exclusionary powers.
That exclusive possession is at core an exclusive right much more than 
it is right to exclude.
That even when it is a right to exclude, the most important things from 
which the possessors may exclude others are rights of identification 
with land, fundamental decision-making over land, and uses or 
alterations of land that cause permanent and significant depletion 
or destruction, rather than mere physical presence on the land.
Other have considered that the right to alienate (see Honore’s right 5) 
is necessary, else there is no property. For example, Justice Blackburn 
wrote in the Milirrpum Decision, ‘I think that property, in its many 
forms, generally implies the right to use or enjoy, the right to exclude 
others, and the right to alienate’ (cited by Williams 1986:199) However, 
this restriction overlooks and ignores the classical work of Maine17 that 
communal landed property in some societies is inalienable and people 
acquire rights in it, not through purchase or inheritance, but through 
their gaining membership of the perduring corporation that owns it. 
As Williams (1986:91) noted, succession to land amongst the Yolngu 
was not well understood by anthropologists in 1970 nor was the topic 
developed clearly in evidence during the hearings. The insistence that 
the right to alienate is criterial to property is perhaps based upon the 
mistaken assumption that land is always a commodity (something that 
can be bought and sold) in a system of market exchange based upon 
contracts between buyers and sellers. But as we have just noted, real 
property existed before the emergence of markets for land in com-
plex societies, and certainly it existed long before the emergence of 
capitalism.
In analysing and describing Aboriginal systems of tenure, the 
Honore listing is helpful to insure one has comprehensively listed the 
17  See footnote 33 below. 
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several kinds or property rights. Certainly, one must modify, reformu-
late and expand some of them, say, to note that owners have certain 
ceremonial rights in specific sites, that owners have the right to be 
asked for permission to enter and use country, etc. What is missing in 
Honore’s listing are ‘the right to state ‘proper’ (customary-lawful) pos-
sessive claims over land, [and] the right to speak for, on behalf of, or 
even authoritatively about the country and its content as cultural prop-
erty (i.e. to represent it, in both senses)’ (Sutton 1996a:12). These are 
universally found in Aboriginal tenure systems.
Types of property right systems
Berkes18 and Farvar (1989:9–10) and Tisdell and Roy (1996:4), resource and 
development economists, identified four ideal types of tenure systems (‘prop-
erty regimes’)19. These are (we have slightly rephrased their definitions):
18  I came across the Berkes (1989a) volume only toward the end of my 
research and writing of this chapter and I have not had the opportunity 
to make as much use of it here as it merits. It includes papers by anthro-
pologists, e.g. Acheson (1989) and Freeman (1989), and papers treating 
CMT, e.g. Acheson (1989), Baines (1989) and Ruddle (1989). I recom-
mend the book as a significant work to readers on property. The journal 
Marine Resource Economics has also published articles bearing on CMT 
and common property issues, e.g. Ruddle (1988); Ruddle, Hviding and 
Johannes (1992); Yamamoto (1995) and Christy (1996). 
19  Munzer (1990:25, 89, 92–93) contrasted private property with public 
property: ‘The identification of the owners or right-holders facilitates 
additional terminology. If the owners are identifiable entities distinguish-
able from some larger group, there is private property. The most common 
example is individual private property, where an individual person is the 
owner—in severalty, as lawyers say. Other sorts of private property exist 
when the owners or right-holders are persons considered together, such 
as partnerships and co-tenanies, or are artificial entities that represent 
the financial interests of persons, such as corporations. Contrasted with 
private property are various sorts of public property. Here the owners are 
the state, city, community, or tribe. Some forms of ownership involve a 
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1. Private property, where rights are held by individuals and their corpo-
rate counterparts.
2. State property, where rights are held by the state.
3. Communal property (Latin res communis ‘common property’), where 
rights are held by a community of users.
4. Open-access property (Latin res nullius ‘no one’s property’), where 
access is free and open to all.
The term communal property has a long history. In the nineteenth 
century, anthropologists such as Morgan, as well as Marx and Engels, 
regarded the evolution of human society—and specifically, the emer-
gence of capitalism—to have involved the replacement of communal 
property by private property. More recently, Teh and Dwyer (1992:1–
2), an introductory property law text, also distinguished communal 
property from private property and noted that ‘[t]he general non-rec-
ognition of communal property in Anglo-Australian law is traceable to 
the growth of capitalism in western civilisations’. Demsetz (1967:354) 
defined ‘communal ownership’ as rights ‘which can be exercised by all 
members of a community’, and gave the example of the right to walk 
on a city footpath. The Mabo No. 2 decision did not use the term 
mixture of private and public property rights.’ Waldron (1988:38–46) 
distinguished private, collective and common property, and he consid-
ered corporate property in contemporary market-based economies to be 
a ‘mutation of private property’ (pp. 57–59), but noted that it could also 
be a form of collective property too. Radin (1993:2, 11, 16–17, 104, 233) 
distinguished personal property from fungible property. The former is 
constitutive of personhood, and the latter is not. Radin (1993:233 n44) 
wrote: ‘If an object is fungible it is perfectly replaceable with money or 
other objects of its kind. If it is personal it has become bound up with the 
personhood of the holder and is no longer commensurate with money.’ 
Her distinction corresponds closely to the one that Carrier (1995:10) drew 
between possessions and commodities, respectively, and I believe, better 
characterises their differences. Carrier’s conceptualisation of terms and 
their interrelations misses the point that what we humans exchange are 
objects of property. One cannot properly exchange what one does not own 
or have property rights in. 
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communal property, but used a series of phrases that leave no doubt 
that the High Court believed that traditional Aboriginal rights and 
interests in land were such that it was communal property. The phrases 
used are ‘communal rights and interests in land’, ‘communal native title’, 
‘communal title’, ‘communal proprietary interest’, ‘communal usufruc-
tory occupation’, ‘communal occupation’, ‘communal lands’, ‘common 
law communal native title’ and ‘traditional communal title’.20
The relationship of communal property to the term common prop-
erty bears some examination because the latter term is sometimes used 
to signify both common property and open-access property as defined 
above by Tisdell and Roy (1996). For this reason, Cordell (1989:6) was 
careful to distinguish sea tenure from ‘common property, the catch-all 
notion invoked to categorize fishing, fishermen and particular man-
agement problems associated with fisheries’. He wrote (Cordell 1989:4) 
‘that the world’s inshore seas, at least from the standpoint of many tradi-
tional fishing societies, may not or should not be thought of as common 
property—that is, in the sense of open access, a precondition for many 
Western legal and theoretical usages of the term’. Here Cordell alluded 
to the common property resource model that Hardin (1968) popular-
ised in his well-known paper, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.21 Cordell 
(1992:35–36) later said that Hardin’s and his sympathisers’ model does 
not ‘accurately portray fishermen’s and indigenous people’s attitudes 
and actions in using marine resources, scarce resources, and sea space, 
or to guide management of traditional economies’. Cordell (1993:162) 
further noted that ‘CMT institutions are distinct from ... open-access 
commons or ‘common pool’ resources’.
In an endnote, Cordell (1989:22–23) expanded on the point:
There is still no consensus regarding the fisheries definitions, 
theories and models of common property advanced by econ-
20  We cite no specific passages here, but we searched the electronic text 
of the decision with our wordprocessor to assemble them. 
21  Demsetz (1967), Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) are in the same vein 
as Hardin (1968). 
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omists... Disagreement over terminology in part reflects a 
tendency to interchange and indiscriminately use ‘common 
property,’ the ‘commons,’ ‘common pool,’ ‘communal,’ ‘pub-
lic domain’ and ‘public good.’ For example, Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop (1975) argue that common property rights refer 
to a condition in which a number of owners are coequal in 
their use rights, Others disagree, pointing out that [the ex-
istence of] use rights violate[s] the basic assumptions of the 
common property model: free and open access...
Thus, Cordell identified two distinct views of common property in 
resource and environmental economics. CMT fits within one of them 
‘as a special system of property rights within the framework of common 
property resource management problems’ (Cordell 1992:13). CMT also 
exemplifies ‘community-based or joint property’ (Cordell 1992:19).22
Ciriachy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975), Quiggin (1986) and McCay 
(1989; 1987) wrote at greater length about the conflict between these 
two models of common property, and all expressed the view that the 
‘tragedy of the commons’ or open-access regime misapplies the term 
property to situations where there is in fact no property.23 McCay 
(1989:205) put it as ‘what is everybody’s is nobody’s’, while Ciriachy-
Wantrup and Bishop (1975:713) phrased it as ‘everybody’s property is 
nobody’s property’.24 The open-access regime certainly does not fit the 
22  See also Cordell (1992:2), where he notes that ‘it is the quality of 
shared or joint tenure that sets CMT systems in question here apart from 
forms of state ownership or private property’.
23  The equation of open access situations with common property is 
conventional in the resource and development economic literature, e.g. 
see Common (1988:224), Neher (1990:5, 29, 51, 88–89, 225), Clark, 
Munro and Charles (1985:100), Tisdell (1991:36, 63–64, 107–121, 147) 
and Tisdell (1993:7, 12). See Christy (1996) for a critical overview of the 
current period in which property rights regimes are replacing open access 
conditions in fisheries around the world. 
24  Neher (1990:88) also wrote, ‘If all property were common property, all 
property would be everybody’s property, and everybody’s property would 
be nobody’s property’. 
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situations of property rights that villagers had in the commons as we 
know them from English history. It may be empirically more applica-
ble to situations where ‘resource raiders’ ignore indigenous property 
rights, as discussed by Ganter (1994) with respect to beche-de-mer, 
pearlshell, trochus and sandalwood in northeastern Australia. Tisdell 
and Roy (1996) disambiguated the two senses of common property, as 
did Berkes and Farvar (1989) before them, by separately designating 
them as ‘communal property’ and ‘open-access property’ (but as we 
have seen, some scholars regard the latter term as an oxymoron).
Common property and joint property
The term common property also occurs in the common law tradition, 
where it contrasts particularly with joint property, but that tradition also 
uses modifying terms which describe how property rights are distrib-
uted over and amongst individuals and groups. It speaks of rights which 
are held jointly, in severalty, in common or in division.25 This leads us 
25  Rights in severalty are rights that an individual person holds to the 
exclusion of others. Where two (or more) persons hold rights, Radcliffe-
Brown (1952[1935]:44–45) distinguished among rights in common (‘A 
and B have similar and equal rights over Z and these are such that the 
rights of A will not conflict with those of B’), joint rights (‘A and B (or 
any number of persons) exercise jointly certain rights over Z’) and rights 
in division (‘A has certain rights over Z and B has certain other definite 
rights’). We discuss rights in common and joint rights below. Radcliffe-
Brown (1952[1935]:44) observes that rights in division ‘may be defined 
either by custom or by a specific contract, or agreement. An example is 
the relation of owner and tenant of a leased land or building’. Brewer and 
Staves (1995:17) refer to rights in division in seventeenth and eighteenth 
century England thus: ‘...It cannot be the case... that in this period[,] 
older, multiple-use rights to property were simply supplanted by a rise of 
absolute property rights [held by individuals]... In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, even interests in land were divided among owners 
and renters, mortgagors and mortgagees, owners with life estates and 
remaindermen, or owners with legal interests and owners with equitable 
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to review Stanner’s (1969) unpublished paper, ‘The Yirrkala Case: Some 
General Principles of Aboriginal Land-Holding’.26 Stanner prepared the 
paper for the plaintiffs’ lawyers as an attempt to reduce the traditional 
land tenure system to principles constructed with terms deriving from 
the Roman and common law traditions, but it was not submitted to 
the court. Amongst other things, Stanner discussed the distribution of 
property rights over and amongst individuals and groups. He (1969:2) 
wrote:
It is unquestionable that all the [A]boriginal peoples who 
have been studied adequately had a conception of land as 
property. The three ideas necessary to the conception de-
monstrably coexisted. That is, (a) an idea of ownership under 
right of title, (b) an idea of corollary right of possession, and 
(c) an idea of correlative or connected rights of occupation 
and use. There were also customary rules determining with 
whom rights properly lay and by whom they could be prop-
erly exercised.
In [A]boriginal understanding land was much more than 
property in our sense; ownership was more intrinsic; title, 
right and possession were embedded in different doctrines; 
and use and occupation were articulated into a highly dis-
tinctive body of social habits; but there was a sufficient coin-
cidence between their underlying ideas and ours in relation 
to all these matters to justify the use of European terms, pro-
vided there are accompanying explanations.
The three ideas mentioned were at the foundation of [A]
boriginal society insofar as it involved land. Taken together, 
they support an inference that there was a real if unverbal-
ized conception of ‘estate’ in land, and that there was a true 
interests.’ 
26  I thank Nancy Williams for providing me with a copy of Stanner 
(1969) and for telling me a bit about its history. Williams (1986:35, 
101–104, 141, 163–164, 202) used and cited Stanner (1969) extensively; 
Sharp (1996) did the same. 
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‘system’ of land-holding, occupation and usage in rational 
connection with the circumstances of aboriginal society.
Stanner (1969:3) noted that some anthropologists have tried explain 
the Aboriginal relationship of ownership between people and land by 
saying the people belonged to the land, rather than the land belonged to 
the people. He thought it to be a true statement, but ‘vague and mysti-
cal’. We believe the statement to be half-true as phrased.27 Both clauses 
are indeed true, but they do not contrast as the rather than-complemen-
tiser signifies. Thus, it is true both that Aboriginal people belong to the 
land and that the land belongs to Aboriginal people. The predicate in 
the first clause signifies inalienable possession, the whole-to-part rela-
tionship. Inalienable possession is the relationship of a person’s body 
(the physical site of the self) to their head. Aboriginal people are part of 
their land because they incarnate spirit that comes from it. The predi-
cate in the second clause signifies alienable possession, the socially and 
culturally constituted phenomenon of ownership. Alienable possession 
is the relationship of a headhunter to his severed trophy. Rephrased, 
we can say that Aboriginal people belong to the land and they own the 
27  In an earlier piece, I (Rigsby 1993:147) attacked ‘the silly notion that 
‘traditional Aboriginal wisdom is that the land owns the people who live 
on it’ (Kaufman 1992:38)’ for being ‘a romantic construction of Aboriginal 
people that is both untrue and politically harmful to their interests’. I 
quoted the late Jack Bruno’s Yir-Yoront text which translates closely as:
I am the owner of [this] country.
It’s my property.
They will never take away this our land.
They will not take it from us.
For we want to keep walking about in plenty of room.
I have also heard many Lamalama people assert that they own specific 
land and sea country. Having read and pondered Stanner’s statement, 
I have changed his analysis and understanding of the complex propo-
sition it encodes and developed them further. See also pp. 200–201 on 
Sandbeach People’s religion below. Williams (1986:102, 199) provided 
other references to the view that the land owns Aboriginal people, that 
Aboriginal people belong to the land. Note also Davis (1989:39–40). 
A survey of property theory and tenure types
61
land, but not that the land owns them (except in a secondary metaphor-
ical sense).
Stanner further elucidated the relationship between people and land 
by describing it as dual. That is, the relationship was at once in animam 
‘in spirit’28 and in rem ‘in a thing’. In other words, the relationship 
had both spiritual and material dimensions. The root29 of Aboriginal 
title derived from the ‘historic-genetic’ relation of the owning group 
to particular land in animam (i.e. part-to-whole), and the group’s in 
rem relationship (i.e. its ownership of the land) resulted from it and 
depended upon it. Stanner (1969:3) described this dual relation of own-
ership as a first fundamental axiom.
Stanner’s second fundamental axiom was that ‘the clearest, most 
unequivocal, most enduring and most perfect ownership-relation 
between persons and land’ was that ‘between a patrilineal descent group 
(clan) or similar group and a more or less definite tract or region or set 
28  Stanner used the phrase in animum, but this was an error. He incor-
rectly selected the masculine noun animus ‘intellect, judgement, courage, 
commitment’, where he plainly intended the feminine noun anima ‘soul, 
vital principle, life’. The preposition in governs the accusative case in such 
phrases, so that we purists must use ‘rights in animam’ with the feminine 
accusative singular form of the noun, not in animum with the mascu-
line accusative singular form of another noun. Don Barrett, my Latinist 
colleague at The University of Queensland, enlightened me on these 
linguistic matters. 
29  The ‘root’ of a title is the historical event which gave rise to it. 
There were no written title deeds to record, for example, that so-and-so 
acquired such-and-such land by purchase or grant of the Crown. Instead, 
Aboriginal people in the north know and tell how the Dreamings or 
Story-Beings fashioned specific landscapes and perhaps ‘sat down’ in a 
place to remain for all time. The root of their title derives from the specific 
creative acts of the ancestral beings during the Dreamtime or Story-Time 
and from the unbroken links of spirit that connect them, their deceased 
ancestors (called the ‘Old People’ on eastern Cape York Peninsula) and 
specific land. It is their spiritual relationship to land which gives rise to 
their in rem relationship to it. 
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of localities or places’ (1969:3). We need not dwell on the point, but we 
note there has been extensive debate the past three decades or so over 
the character of owner groups in classical and contemporary Aboriginal 
social organisation. Whatever position one takes, one surely must rec-
ognise that significant property rights are vested in groups, but at the 
same time, people are linked to land and to one another through multi-
ple, cross-cutting ties (Rumsey 1996).
Stanner’s axioms rested upon fundamental postulates that 
Aboriginal people did not conceive to be open to question. Three pos-
tulates were:
Human life was indivisibly corporeal and spiritual because each person 
as corporeal being incarnated one or more spiritual elements ‘which 
had entered or affected or become one with the embryo at or about 
the time of conception’ (1969:4). These pre-existed conception and 
they persisted after death at least for a time. Importantly, these 
numinous beings came from a specific place or made themselves 
known at a specific place. This indissoluble connection of a person 
to their place of origin by ‘a spiritual link externally manifest in land 
as an outward and visible sign’ was the relation in animam.
The corporeal and spiritual elements were so indissoluble that each 
person ‘was ‘with’ or ‘of ’ a locality, or a locality was ‘with’ or ‘of ’ him 
or her’ (1969:4). Thus specific country or land was intrinsic to the 
identity of persons and owning groups.30
30 One can find much evidence for this around the country in the 
indigenous language patterns for clan names and for personal names 
which are constructed with place names. For example, Lamalama speakers 
call the Olkola-speaking clan who have Dog Story as their main totem, 
Mbatorrarrbinh ‘People who have Dog [Story]’, while they call certain 
of their close neighbours Mbarimanggudinhma ‘People from Ngudinh 
[country]’. In the southern part of the Sandbeach Region—see chapter 12 
below—significant members of a clan were sometimes named for import-
ant places in their estates. For example, Old Man Monkey Port Stewart 
was called Aakurr Yintyingga ‘Yintjingga Country’ after the indigenous 
name for the Port Stewart area, and Old Lady Emma Claremont was 
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Some empirical data are in order here. Sunlight Bassani explained to 
Rigsby (1995) that the land or ground around Port Stewart is part of 
his group, just the same as the trees, the animals, ‘anything you name’, 
shade, etc. ‘That’s our family.’, he concluded. This is a clear statement 
that Lamalama people share spirit with their land. It also asserts that 
Lamalama people and their land are parts of a whole universe of social 
actors.
 Each member of an owning group was related to their land 
jointly ‘with every other member of the group, without dis-
tinction of sex. age, status or any other criterion. The rela-
tion was truly joint, as distinct from common or several, in 
a sense closely analogous to the European conception of the 
‘four unities’ of joint tenancy’ (Stanner 1969:4).31
In the common law tradition, the four unities criterial to joint own-
ership or tenancy are (a) title—each co-owner must acquire by virtue 
of the same instrument or act, (b) possession—each co-owner must 
be entitled to possession of the whole property, (c) interest—each 
co-owner must acquire the same interest, and (d) time—each co-owner 
must acquire the rights at the same time (Hardy Ivamy 1993:145; Martin 
1990:220; Rutherford and Bone 1993:185–186; Walker 1980:667). 
Stanner (1969:4) noted that all these conditions were met, except that 
called Ngaachi Yalmarraka ‘Yalmarraka Country’ after a major place at the 
mouth of Breakfast Creek. The former name is Uuk-Umpithamu and the 
latter is Umpila. 
31 Note that Cordell (1992:2, 19) correctly identified CMT ownership 
as joint—see endnote 22—but in common law terms, the object of joint 
ownership is joint property, not common property. Driver (1961:244, 
245, 252) also identified joint property as a major type amongst Native 
American peoples. Lowie (1929:557, 559) said that amongst the Hidatsa 
‘children inherit the right of jointly buying proprietary rights from their 
own father’ and amongst the Nootka, ‘the lineage of eldest-born descen-
dants virtually consititutes a joint-company as regards the relevant rights’. 
Also Hiatt (1962), Williams (1986) and Sharp (1996) speak of joint owner-
ship of their land by Gidjingarli, Yolngu and Meriam people, respectively. 
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the unity of time in Aboriginal ownership ‘extended to the unborn and 
the dead as well as the living’.
The common law tradition distinguishes joint ownership or tenancy 
from co-ownership or tenancy in common ‘in that joint tenants have 
one interest in the whole, and no interest in any particular part’, whereas 
‘[t]enants in common have several and distinct interests in their respec-
tive parts which may be in unequal shares and for interests of unequal 
duration’ (Burke 1977:2:1748). Tenants in common hold property by 
unity of possession because none of them knows their own individual 
part, but this is the only unity in the ownership because they may hold 
different kinds of interest, they may hold from different sources of title 
and their interests may vest in each at different times.32
Stanner (1969:8) later expanded his argument for joint ownership 
by noting that ‘[t]he estate could not be diminished by the deaths of any 
of the joint owners; it remained the undivided property of the survivors; 
it did not, in a strict sense, pass by ‘inheritance’ between generations but 
remained ‘in’ the dual spiritual-corporeal stream of life—certainly, no 
one could be ‘disinherited’.33 He also wrote ‘that the rights were vested, 
not severally in individual persons, or in common between persons, but 
jointly in a particular kind of kinship group’(1969:9).
32 Rumsey (1996:4, 8, 9) speaks of ‘rights-in-common’, but his phrase 
seems to signify in an ordinary English way that people share the same 
interests, not that they have different interests. 
33 This formulation built on the understanding of Maine (1931[1861]) 
that: ‘Ancient law ... knew next to nothing of individuals. Property was 
held and transmitted not by private citizens but by corporations of blood 
relatives linked by descent in the male line and putatively descended from 
a common male ancestor. Corporate identity was perpetual; corporate 
property was undivided, unmalleable, and sometimes absolutely inalien-
able... Neither ethnology nor classical scholarship supported the view that 
human social life began on the basis of contracts between individuals. 
What they suggested, rather, was that society had evolved towards con-
tract and private property from an earlier condition in which the rights 
of individuals were defined and protected on the basis of their status as 
members of corporate descent groups (Hiatt 1996:14). 
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A lawyer, we believe, would be unlikely to accept Stanner’s qual-
ification of the unity of time and would not accept his argument that 
traditional Aboriginal land tenure meets all the criteria for common 
law joint tenure. But of the forms of common law tenure, it most closely 
resembles joint tenure.
Stanner (1969:10) also noted that there might be a few areas of land 
in the Yirrkala region that were ‘areas of commonalty’ or ‘box up’ places. 
He thought these lay outside the clan estates and ‘on the hunting ranges 
of merging or overlapping bands’, but they ‘in no way threaten or qualify 
the clan estates’.
Here we believe that Stanner’s analysis went offtrack when he 
spoke of ‘areas of commonalty’. We know what he intended in ordinary 
English, but in legal terminology, we think it more accurate to regard 
‘Murri roads’ and ‘company land’ (to use the Cape York Creole and 
Aboriginal English terms) again as the joint property of two or more 
owner groups and their members,34 not as their common property.
To summarise this far, we have considered Stanner’s arguments that 
Aboriginal property rights in land are held jointly, not in common, not 
in severalty (individually), and not in division. Becker (1977:25) also 
noted that:
When a thing is jointly owned in the full liberal sense, for 
example, any disposition of the thing by one person without 
the consent of the others is a violation of their rights of own-
ership—even if one has taken no more than one’s share [but 
one’s individual share is not known in joint ownership! BR]. 
Joint ownership means joint management, and more funda-
mentally,  joint right to the capital.
In the Cliff Islands and Lakefield National Parks land claim transcripts, 
there is much evidence for joint Lamalama ownership of their estate, 
and we give just one bit of it here. When Rigsby examined Sunlight 
Bassani on the topic of whether he could sell or give away part of the 
34 See also Hiatt (1962:279–280) on ‘company’ or joint ownership of land 
amongst the Gidjingarli. 
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Lamalama estate, he included in his reply:
If I’m going to sell him, if I say I’m going to sell it, I might 
be get killed from somebody else, my family, ‘What do you 
want to sell that country for? That’s our country’. (dftT1808/
fnlT1875)
This makes reference to the need to consult with other joint owners on 
matters of import, and thus it is evidence for joint ownership.35
Finally, Stanner (1969:8–9) spoke of ‘several classes of less precise 
rights which lay with people who were not of the true joint owners’ 
and he called such people ‘secondary right-holders’. He distinguished 
amongst:
1. Wives who ‘had virtually an unconditional right of residence on and 
occupation and use of their husbands’ lands in rem’
2. Husbands who ‘had a clear but probably less express right to visit, 
occupy and use his wife’s clan lands’.
3. ‘A woman’s children [who] had an express right to visit, live on, occupy 
and use the lands of her patrilineal clan and in many cases they had as 
well some degree of right to use the lands in anim[a]m’.
4. Men and women who ‘had acknowledged ritual duties ... involving per-
sons or categories of persons in other clans’, amongst other rights, had ‘a 
right of entry into that clan’s domains and, while there, to support from 
the resources of that clan’.
5. ‘A somewhat undifferentiated general public right to limited visitation, 
occupation and use by the owners’ consent’.
These certainly must be part of any adequate analysis and description 
of Aboriginal tenure systems. It is also clear that individuals and groups 
may sometimes transform secondary rights into primary property 
rights36 over time in a variety of circumstances relating to succession, 
regencies and even land claim actions.
35 See also Williams (1886:80) on the need to consult within a Yolngu 
clan. 
36 Williams (1986:175) preferred ‘presumptive’ and ‘subsidiary’ to 
primary and secondary, while Sutton (1997) spoke of ‘transferrable’ and 
‘transferred’ rights. 
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we surveyed property and tenure generally. We identi-
fied communal property as an ideal type of tenure system. We noted that 
the phrase ‘common property’ signifies two different situations amongst 
resource and environmental economists, while it signifies something 
else again in the common law tradition. One sense is that of commu-
nal property, which is the indigenous property regime attributed to 
Aboriginal people, and the second is that of open-access property. For 
its part, the common law distinguishes common property from joint 
property. We also reviewed Stanner’s argument that most Aboriginal 
property rights in land are held jointly, not in common, not in sever-
alty (individually), and not in division.37 We accept Stanner’s argument 
and the observations of other anthropologists regarding joint tenure 
in Aboriginal Australia, and we suggest that the communal property 
regime as an ideal type should be interpreted also as joint tenure.
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